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After laying dormant for more than two decades, the rare disaster framework has
emerged as a leading contender to explain facts about the aggregate market, interest
rates, and financial derivatives. In this paper we survey recent models of disaster risk
that provide explanations for the equity premium puzzle, the volatility puzzle, return
predictability and other features of the aggregate stock market. We show how these
models can also explain violations of the expectations hypothesis in bond pricing, and
the implied volatility skew in option pricing. We review both modeling techniques and
results and consider both endowment and production economies. We show that these
models provide a parsimonious and unifying framework for understanding puzzles in
asset pricing.
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1 Introduction
Many asset pricing puzzles arise from an apparent disconnect between returns on financial
assets and economic fundamentals. A classic example is the equity premium puzzle, namely
that the expected return on stocks over government bills is far too high to be explained
by the observed risk in consumption. Another famous example is the volatility puzzle.
Economic models trace stock return volatility to news about future cash flows or discount
rates. Yet dividend and interest rate data themselves provide very little basis for explaining
this volatility. Other puzzles can be stated in similar ways.
In this paper, we survey a class of explanations for these and other findings known as rare
disaster models. These models assume that there is a small probability of a large drop in
consumption. Under the assumption of isoelastic utility, this large drop is extremely painful
for investors and has a large impact on risk premia, and, through risk premia, on prices. The
goal of these models, broadly speaking, is to take this central insight and incorporate it into
quantitative models with a wide range of testable predictions.
How does the risk of rare disasters differ from the risk that has already been carefully
explored in models of asset pricing over the last quarter century? What differentiates a
rare disaster from merely a large shock? Crucial to understanding of rare disasters is to
understand when they have not occurred, namely in the postwar period in the United States.
A central contention of the rare disaster literature is that the last 65 years of U.S. data
has been a period of calm that does not represent the full spectrum of events that investors
incorporate into prices. This already says something about the probabilities of rare disasters:
for example, if the probability were 10% a year, then the probability of having observed no
disasters is 0.9065, or 0.001. While we may be very lucky in the United States, and while
there may be survival bias in the fact that most finance scholars find themselves situated in
the U.S. and studying U.S. financial markets, assuming this much luck and thus this much
survival bias would be unsettling. Thus historical time series says that disasters, if they
exist, must be rare.
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A second aspect of rare disasters is that they must be large, so that their size essentially
rules out the normal distribution, just as the discussion above essentially rules out disasters
that occur with probability 10%. Thus the assumption of rare disasters is akin to rejecting
the assumption of normality, while still allowing for the fact that data might plausibly appear
to be normal over a time span that lasts as long as 65 years.
This rejection of the normal distribution sounds like a technical condition, divorced from
underlying economics. However, it is of fundamental importance to understanding why one
obtains qualitatively different results from incorporating rare disasters into economic models.
Under the normal distribution, risk is easy to measure because the normal distribution
implies that small and thus frequently observed changes in the process of interest can be
used to make inferences about large and thus infrequently observed changes in prices and
fundamentals. Stated in econometric terms, normality is a strong identifying assumption.
If one seeks to measure risk, and the object of interest has the normal distribution, then a
small amount of data (65 years is more than enough) can be used to obtain a very accurate
estimate of the risk. The assumption of normality, while not universal, is ubiquitous in
finance. For example, the diffusion process is the standard model used in continuous-time
finance. Yet a diffusion is nothing more than a normal distribution with parameters that
may themselves vary according to normal distributions. And while the assumption of the
normal distribution is often clearly stated, its consequence, that small changes in a process
are informative of larger changes, is not.
In contrast to the situation in standard models, risk in rare disaster models is difficult
to measure. Small variations in a process of interest are not informative of large variations.
Thus investors may rationally believe a disaster is within the realm of possibility, even after
many years of data to the contrary. This insight leads to a rethinking of the connections
between stock prices and fundamentals, as shown by the models that we survey.
The rest of this survey proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a general result on risk
premia in models of disaster risk. This result is a building block for many other results that
follow. Section 3 presents the basic model of consumption disasters that is used to explain
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the equity premium puzzle, and recent extensions. Section 4 discusses the dynamic models
that can explain the volatility puzzle. Section 5 discusses extensions to fixed income and to
options. Finally, Section 6 reviews the literature on disaster risk in production-based models.
These models endogenize consumption and cash flows and offer a deeper understanding of
the links between stock prices and the real economy.
2 Disaster Risk Premia
Most asset pricing puzzles, in one way or another, come down to a difference between a
modeled and observed risk premium (the expected return on a risky asset above a riskless
asset). This is obvious when the puzzle refers to the mean of a return. When the puzzle
refers to a volatility or covariance it is also true, since time-variation in risk premia appear
to be a major determinant of stock price variation. For this reason, we begin our survey
with a theorem on risk premia in models of disaster risk.1
Consider a model driven by normal risk, modeled by a vector of Brownian (or diffusive)
shocks Bt, and by rare event risk, modeled by a Poisson shock Nt. The Poisson shock has
intensity λt, meaning that it is equal to 1 with probability λt and zero otherwise.
2 This basic
jump-diffusion model was introduced by Merton (1976) for the purpose of calculating option
prices when stock prices are discontinuous.
We assume a process for state prices. This process can either be interpreted as the
marginal utility of the representative agent (as will be the case in the models that follow), or
as simply the process that is guaranteed to exist as long as there is no arbitrage (Harrison
and Kreps (1979)). The state-price density is given by pit and follows the process
dpit
pit−
= µpi dt+ σpi dBt + (e
Zpi − 1) dNt. (1)
1This result unifies results already reported in the literature, for, e.g. iid models of stock prices (Barro
(2006)), dynamic models of stock prices (Longstaff and Piazzesi (2004) and Wachter (2013), and exchange
rate models (Farhi and Gabaix (2014)).
2More precisely, the probability of k jumps over the course of a period τ is equal to e−λτ (λτ)
k
k! . We take
τ to be in units of years.
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The parameters µpi and σpi could be stochastic (here and in what follows we assume Bt is
a row vector so whatever multiplies it, in this case σpi, is a column vector). The ratio of pit
to itself at different points of time is commonly referred to as the stochastic discount factor.
The change in log pit, should a rare event occur, is Zpi, a random variable which we assume
for now has a time-invariant distribution. The reason to model the change in log pit rather
than pit, is to ensure that prices remain positive. Disasters are times of low consumption,
high marginal utility, and therefore high state prices. Thus we emphasize the case of Zpi > 0.




= µS dt+ σS dBt + (e
ZS − 1) dNt. (2)
Again, µS and σS can be stochastic. The change in the log stock prices in the event of a
disaster is given by the random variable ZS, which can be correlated with Zpi and has a
time-invariant distribution. Once again, the model is written so that the price cannot go
negative. Most cases of interest involve a price that falls during a disaster, which corresponds
to ZS < 0. We will use the notation Eν to denote expectations taken with respect to the
joint distribution of ZS and Zpi.
Let Dt denote the continuous dividend stream paid by the asset (this may be zero). Then
the expected return (precisely, the continuous-time limit of the expected return over a finite
interval) is defined as
rSt = µS + λtEν [e
ZS − 1] + Dt
St
,
which includes the drift in the price, the expected change in price due to a jump, and
the dividend yield. Proposition 1 gives a general expression for risk premia under these
assumptions.
Proposition 1. Assume no-arbitrage, with state prices given by (1). Consider an asset
specified with price process (2). Let rt denote the continuously compounded riskfree rate.
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Then continous-time limit of the risk premium for this asset is
rSt − rt = −σpiσ>S − λtEν
[
(eZpi − 1)(eZS − 1)] . (3)
The expected return over the riskfree rate in periods without disasters will be
rSt − rt + λtEν [eZS − 1] = −σpiσ>S − λtEν
[
eZpi(eZS − 1)] . (4)
Consider the first equation in Proposition 1, the risk premium on the asset with price
St. There are two terms: the first corresponds to the Brownian risk, and it takes a standard
form (see Duffie (2001, Chapter 6)). The second corresponds to Poisson risk. Because
the Brownian shocks and Poisson shocks are independent, we can consider the two sources
separately. Both terms represent covariances. The second term is the covariance of prices
and marginal utility in the event of a disaster, multiplied by the probability that a disaster
occurs.3 For an asset that falls in price when a disaster occurs, the product (eZpi−1)(eZS−1)
is negative. Such an asset will have a higher expected return because of its exposure to
disasters.
Now consider the second equation in Proposition 1. This is the expected return that
would be observed in samples in which disasters do not occur. It is equal to (3), minus the
expected price change in the event of a disaster. Because the price falls in a disaster, (4) will
be greater than the true risk premium: observing samples without disasters leads to a bias,
as pointed out by Brown, Goetzmann, and Ross (1995) and Goetzmann and Jorion (1999).
In what follows, we will quantitatively evaluate the sizes of the disaster term in the true
risk premium (3), and its relation to the observed risk premium (4) in economies where stock
prices are determined endogenously. We will also show that disasters have a role to play
in the Brownian terms σpi and σS. If, for example, the probability of a disaster varies over
time, then this will in general be reflected in σpi and σS. Thus the equations above, taken at
3Because the expected change in both quantities over an infinitesimal interval is zero, the expected co-
movement between these quantities is in fact the covariance.
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face value, may understate the role of disasters.
3 Consumption Disasters
Two central puzzles in asset pricing are the equity premium puzzle (Mehra and Prescott
(1985)) and the riskfree rate puzzle (Weil (1989)). Barro (2006) shows that, when disasters
are calibrated using international GDP data, disaster risk can resolve both puzzles. Here,
we consider a continuous-time equivalent of Barro’s model, in which we make use of a now-
standard extension of time-additive isoelastic utility that separates risk aversion from the
inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (Epstein and Zin (1989), Duffie and
Epstein (1992)).4 This extension, because it is based on isoelastic utility, implies that risk
premia and riskfree rates are stationary even as consumption and wealth grow, just as in the
actual economy. This scale-invariance will make calibration possible. Details of the utility
specification are contained in Appendix B.
In what follows, the parameter β refers to the rate of time preference, γ to relative risk
aversion, and ψ (in an approximate sense) to the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
(EIS).5
3.1 The model
Our model for consumption follows along the same lines as the model considered in Section 2:
dCt
Ct−
= µ dt+ σ dBt + (e
Zt − 1) dNt. (5)
As in Section 2, Bt is a standard Brownian motion and Nt is a Poisson process with constant
intensity λ. Zt is a random variable whose time-invariant distribution ν is independent of
Nt and Bt. A disaster is represented by dNt = 1, and e
Zt is the change in consumption
4See Martin (2013) for a solution to a general class of models of which this model is an example.
5We follow standard terminology in referring to ψ as the EIS. However, in the models we consider,
uncertainty implies that there is not a simple mapping between ψ and the sensitivity of consumption to
interest rates.
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should a disaster occur. Thus disasters are represented by Zt < 0; using an exponential
ensures that consumption stays positive. In this model consumption growth is independent
and identically distributed over time. One advantage of this model is that it allows for long
periods of low volatility and thin tails (like the post-war period in the United States), along
with large consumption disasters (as represented by the Great Depression).
The model is not complete without a specification for the dividend process for the aggre-
gate market. The simplest assumption is that dividends equal consumption. However, it is
sometimes convenient to allow the aggregate market to differ from the claim to total wealth.




though for much of the discussion in this section, φ will be restricted to 1. The parameter φ
is sometimes referred to as “leverage”. The specification (6) allows us to take into account
the empirical finding that dividends are procyclical in normal times and fall far more than
consumption in the event of a disaster (Longstaff and Piazzesi (2004)). Ito’s Lemma for
jump-diffusion processes (Duffie (2001, Appendix F)) then implies
dDt
Dt−
= µD dt+ φσ dBt + (e
φZt − 1) dNt, (7)




Let St denote the price of the dividend claim. In this iid model, the price-dividend ratio
St/Dt is a constant. Note that a constant price-dividend ratio implies that the percent
decline in prices is equal to the percent decline in dividends, so the process St is given by:
dSt
St−
= µS dt+ φσ dBt + (e
φZt − 1) dNt (8)
for a constant µS which we leave unspecified for now.
In this iid model with isoelastic utility, the marginal utility process pit is proportional to
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C−γt , where γ represents relative risk aversion.
6 Thus, by Ito’s Lemma,
dpit
pit−
= µpi dt− γσ dBt + (e−γZt − 1) dNt. (9)
Again, we leave the constant µpi unspecified for the moment. Thus marginal utility jumps
up if a disaster occurs. The greater is risk aversion, the greater the jump.
3.2 The equity premium
Using Proposition 1 we can derive the equity premium in the model:
rS − r = γφσ2 − λEν
[
(e−γZt − 1)(eφZt − 1)] . (10)
Equation (10) contains two terms. The first, γφσ2 is the basic consumption CAPM term
(Breenden (1979)). The second, as explained in Section 2, is due to the presence of disasters,
and is positive because a disaster is characterized by falling consumption (and thus rising
marginal utility) and falling prices.
For the remainder of this section, we will follow Barro (2006) and Rietz (1988) and
specialize to the unlevered case of φ = 1. Thus our target for the equity premium is the “un-
levered” premium, which can reasonably be taken to be 4.8% a year (Nakamura, Steinsson,
Barro, and Ursu´a (2013)). Note that thus far, only risk aversion appears in (10), and this
equation is identical to what we would find in the time-additive utility case.
In writing down the process for consumption (5), we have split risk into two parts, a
Brownian part and a rare disaster part. The equation for the risk premium (10) reflects
this separation. Consider two ways of interpreting U.S. consumption data from 1929 to the
present.7 First assume that consumption growth is lognormally distributed, namely (5), with
the jump component set to zero. We can then compute σ2 based on the measured volatility
of this series, which is about 2.16% per annum. With an unlevered equity premium of 4.8%,
6For convenience, we provide a proof of this standard result in the Online Appendix.
7The numbers in this section refer to real per capita annual consumption growth, available from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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γ would have to be about 102 to reconcile the equity premium with the data. This is the
equity premium puzzle.
Now consider a different way to view the same data. In this view, the Great Depres-
sion represents a rare disaster. Consumption declined about 25% in the Great Depression.
Assuming a 1% probability of such a disaster occurring (and, for the moment, disregarding
the tiny first term), explaining an equity premium of 4.8% only requires γ = 10.5. This
is the point made by Rietz (1988) in response to Mehra and Prescott (1985). Many would
say that a risk aversion of 10.5 is still too high, and in fact more recent calibrations justify
the equity premium with a lower risk aversion coefficient, but without a doubt, this simple
reconsideration of the risk in consumption data has made a considerable dent in the equity
premium.
Which way of viewing the consumption data is more plausible? Given the low volatility
of consumption over the 65-year postwar period (1.25%), a constant volatility of 2.16% is
virtually impossible, as can be easily seen by running Monte Carlo simulations of 65 years
with normally distributed shocks. If consumption were normally distributed, observing a
sample 65 years long with a volatility of 1.25% occurs with probability less than one in a
million.
What about the rare disaster model? Here, Mehra and Prescott (1988), and, more
recently, Constantinides (2008) and Julliard and Ghosh (2012) have argued that this too is
improbable. The problem is that consumption did not decline by 25% instantaneously in
the Great Depression, but rather there were several years of smaller declines. Our equations,
however, assume that the declines are instantaneous. Does this matter? An interesting
difference between jump, or Poisson, risk and Brownian, or normal risk, is that it might
matter. Normally distributed risk (assuming independent and identically distributed shocks)
is the same regardless of whether one measures it over units of seconds or of years. Not so in
the case of Poisson risk. As the Great Depression took 4 years to unfold, suppose instead of a
1% chance of 25% decline, we had a 4% chance of a 7% decline.8 In this case, the population
8A total decline of 25% implies Z = −0.288. For this exercise, we divide Z by 4, to find Z = −0.072.
This implies a percentage decline of 6.9%.
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equity premium would only be 0.31%, while the observed equity premium would be 0.59%;
in other words an order of magnitude lower. These authors argue that an all-at-once 25%
decline, given U.S. consumption history, is too unlikely to be worth considering.
As we will see, however, it matters very much whether one models the consecutive de-
clines as iid jumps, and whether one requires time-additive utility. In a sense, time-additive
utility is a knife-edge case, in which the only source of risk that matters in equilibrium is
instantaneous shocks to consumption growth. When the agent has a preference over early
resolution of uncertainty, and shocks are not iid but rather cluster together, the model once
again produces equity premia of similar magnitude as if the decline happened all at once.
We will show this in a simple model in Section 3.7.
Clearly, calibration of the disaster probability λt and the disaster distribution Zt is key
to evaluating whether the model can explain the equity premium puzzle. We now turn to
calibration of these parameters.
3.3 Calibration to international macroeconomic consumption data
Following the work of Rietz (1988), rare disasters as an explanation of the equity premium re-
ceived little attention for a number of years (exceptions include Veronesi (2004) and Longstaff
and Piazzesi (2004)). This changed with the work of Barro (2006), who calibrates the model
above to data on GDP declines for 35 countries over the last century (the original data are
from Maddison (2003)). A disaster is defined as a cumulative decline in GDP of over 15%.
Altogether he finds 60 occurrences of cumulative declines of over 15%, for the 35 countries
over the 100 years. This implies a probability of a disaster of 1.7%. These declines also
give a distribution of disaster events. This size distribution puts the Great Depression in a
different light. The average value is 29%, about the same as the 25% decline assumed above.
However, the presence of much larger declines in the sample, as large as 64%, combined with
isoelastic utility, implies that the model behaves closer to the case of a 50% decline.
Barro (2006) uses GDP data; consumption data are closer to aggregate consumption
in the model. In normal times, GDP is considerably more volatile than consumption, so
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calibrating a consumption-based economy to GDP data makes puzzles (artificially) easier
to solve. Barro and Ursu´a (2008) build a dataset consisting of consumption declines across
these, and additional countries. They also broaden and correct errors in the GDP dataset of
Maddison (2003). They find that it matters little for the equity premium whether consump-
tion or GDP is used. This is because the largest disasters, which drive the equity premium
result, occur similarly in consumption and GDP. In fact, in wars, GDP tends to decline by
less because it is buffered by war-time government spending.
Figure 1 shows the histogram of consumption declines across the full set of countries
(Panel A) and OECD countries (Panel B). There is significant mass to the right of 25%; it
is these larger disasters that make it possible to account for the equity premium with risk
aversion as low as 4. The large numbers to the right represent the effects of World War
II in Europe and Asia.9 The rare disaster model embeds into U.S. equity prices a positive
probability (albeit very small) of a consumption decline of this magnitude.
The disasters observed in these data are not independent of course: Most of the events,
particularly in OECD countries can be associated with either World War I, World War II,
or the Great Depression. Does this matter? If we were to formally estimate the probability
of a binomial model of a disaster/no disaster state, it might matter for the standard errors.
However, a 2% probability does not seem unreasonable even if one took the view that there
were three world wide disasters in the course of 100 years (or perhaps two...). Does the lack of
independence matter for the interpretation of the histogram in Figure 1? We could take the
view that we should look at a wealth-weighted consumption decline across all the countries
for the three major disasters. Leaving aside the difficulty of constructing such a measure, we
are then still left with essentially three observations, which does not seem enough to rule out
the histogram in Figure 1.10 One view of these data is they provide a disciplining device for
9This histogram is not exhaustive of the misfortunes that have befallen mankind relatively recently that
might be priced into equity returns. For example, the data include neither the experience of the American
South following the Civil War, nor the experience of Russia throughout this century.
10A related question is whether it is appropriate to apply these international data to the United States.
Given our assumed parameters, the U.S. experience is far from an anomaly, as Nakamura, Steinsson, Barro,
and Ursu´a (2013) discuss. These data can neither prove nor disprove that the U.S. is subject to this
distribution in the minds of investors; this is a matter for prior beliefs.
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what would otherwise constitute a parameter for which we as a profession have very little
information. Nakamura, Steinsson, Barro, and Ursu´a (2013) estimate and solve a model in
which independence of disasters, duration and partial recovery from disasters are taken into
account; they find that the model can still explain the equity premium puzzle for moderate
values of risk aversion.
3.4 Interest rates
We now return to the model of Section 3.1 and consider the interest rate. The presence of
disasters also affects agent’s desire to save. Let β denote the rate of time preference and
ψ the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (see Appendix B). The instantaneous riskfree
rate implied by investor preferences and the consumption process (5) is















(e(1−γ)Zt − 1)− (e−γZt − 1)
]
. (11)
This riskfree rate is perhaps comparable to the real return on Treasury Bills (more on this
below), so the left hand side is about 1.2% in the data. From the point of view of traditional
time-additive utility (γ = 1/ψ and θ = 1) with no disasters, this is a puzzle. Postwar
consumption growth is about 2% a year; combined with a reasonable level of risk aversion,
say, 4, the second term in (11) is about 8%. The third term is negligible for reasonable
parameter values because σ2 is extremely small. Thus β, the rate of time preference, would
have to be significantly negative to explain the Treasury Bill rate in the data (Weil (1989)).
Unlike with the equity premium puzzle, the separation between the EIS and risk aversion can
be helpful here, though it is questionable whether, in this model at least, it can completely
resolve the puzzle (Campbell (2003)).
The term multiplying λ in (11) represents the effect of disasters. Even a small probability
of a disaster can lead to a much lower riskfree rate because disaster states are very painful for
agents, and, in this model at least, savings in the riskfree asset offers complete insurance.11
11Disasters always decrease the riskfree rate. The term 1− 1θ is bounded above by γ/(γ−1), and properties
of the exponential imply that 1γ (e
−γZt − 1) > 1γ−1 ((e−γZt − 1).
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Table 1 reports riskfree rates implied by risk aversion of 4, for various values of the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution. Investors who are more willing to substitute over time are less
sensitive to the presence of disasters, all else equal. However, for all values we consider, the
presence of disasters implies that the riskfree rate is actually negative.
This discussion implies that investors can completely insure against disasters by purchas-
ing Treasury Bills. Historically, some consumption disasters have coincided with default on
government debt, either outright or through inflation. The fact that this was not the case
in the Great Depression, does not mean that investors are ruling it out. Following Barro
(2006), we can account for default by introducing a shock to government debt in the event
of a disaster.12
To introduce default, let Lt denote the price process resulting from rolling over short-






eZL,t − 1) dNt, (12)
where rL is the return on government bills if there were no default. We capture the relation
between default and consumption declines in disasters as follows:
ZL,t =
 Zt with probability q0 otherwise. (13)
This implies that in the event of a disaster, there is a probability q of default, and if this
happens, the percent loss is equal to the percent decline in consumption. We can then apply
Proposition 1 to write down the instantaneous risk premium on this security:
rb − r = −λqEν
[
(e−γZt − 1) (eZt − 1)] . (14)
12In this case, the assumption of complete markets still implies that there exists a riskfree rate, it just isn’t
comparable to the government bill rate. What happens if markets are incomplete and there is no riskfree
rate? This is a hard question to answer, because the representative investor framework no longer applies,
and we are not aware of any work that addresses it. Intuition suggests that this would make the required
compensation for disasters higher rather than lower.
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Finally, by definition we have rb = rL + λqEν [eZt − 1], and so the observed premium on
government debt in samples without disasters is given by




eZt − 1)] . (15)
If we restrict to the case with no leverage, comparing (14) with (10) implies an equity
premium of
rS − rb = γσ2 − (1− q)λEν
[
(e−γZt − 1)(eZt − 1)] . (16)
Furthermore, in samples without disasters, the observed observed equity premium equals
observed rS − rL = γσ2 − (1− q)λEν
[
e−γZt(eZt − 1)] . (17)
The next section combines the results so far to discuss the implications for interest rates and
the equity premium in a calibrated economy.
3.5 Results in a calibrated economy
Table 1 puts numbers to the equity premium and government bill rate using international
consumption data of Barro and Ursu´a (2008). As already discussed, the presence of disasters
has dramatic effects on the level of the riskfree rate. Introducing default actually helps the
model explain the level of the government bill rate in the data.
Table 1 also shows that the international distribution of disasters, combined with a risk
aversion of only 4 implies an equity premium relative to risky government debt of 4.4%,
close to the target of 4.8%. The equity premium that would be observed in samples without
disasters is 4.7%. Most of the model’s ability to explain the equity premium comes from the
higher required return in the presence of disasters, as opposed to the bias in observations of
returns over a sample without disasters. To summarize: disaster risk can explain the equity
premium and riskfree rate puzzles, even if risk aversion is as low as 4, and even if default on
government bills is taken into account.
14
3.6 Disaster probabilities and prices
We now turn to the question of how the disaster probability affects stock prices. Because
this model is iid and the disaster probability is constant, we answer this question using
comparative statics. The comparative statics results nonetheless lay the groundwork for the
dynamic results to come.





























e(1−γ)Zt − 1)− (e(φ−γ)Zt − 1)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Effect of disaster probability on DP ratio
)−1
, (19)
where the last line is shown in Section A of the online appendix. It is the term multiplying
the disaster probability, labeled “effect of disaster probability on DP ratio” that interests us.
As in Campbell and Shiller (1988), we can decompose this term as follows:
Effect of disaster probability on DP ratio =
Eν
[















eφZt − 1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected dividend growth
. (20)
Note that the terms labeled risk-free rate and equity premium are taken from (11) and (10)
respectively. The last term is the direct effect of a disaster on the cash flows to equity.
Intuitively, an increase in the risk of a rare disaster should lower prices because it raises
the equity premium and lowers expected cash flows. Equation 20 shows that there is an
opposing effect coming from the riskfree rate. An increase in the risk of a disaster lowers
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the riskfree rate, raising the price of any asset that is a store of value, including equities.
Thus the net effect on the dividend-price ratio depends on which is greater: the riskfree rate
effect or the (total) equity premium and cash flow effect. The answer is complicated in that
it depends on γ, ψ and φ. We consider three special cases of interest to the literature. To
fix ideas, assume that risk aversion γ is greater than one.
No leverage
This is the case we have been considering thus far in this chapter, and it has the appeal
of parsimony, since we have not yet introduced a theory for why dividends would respond
more than consumption in the event of a disaster. The term inside the expectation in (19)
is positive if and only if θ < 0, namely if and only if the EIS, ψ, is greater than 1.
Time-additive utility
In this case, θ = 1. The term inside the expectation is positive if and only if φ > γ, namely
the responsiveness of dividends in the event of a disaster (or “leverage”) exceeds risk aversion.
EIS = 1
In this case, 1 − 1/θ = 1. The term inside the expectation is positive if and only if φ > 1,
namely if and only if dividends are more responsive to disasters than consumption
Note that, while we use the same parameter φ to determine the responsiveness of divi-
dends to disasters and to normal shocks, it is in fact only the responsiveness of dividends to
disasters that determines the direction of the effect. Note too that this effect is independent
of the debate concerning government default. This changes the decomposition of the dis-
count rate into a government bill rate (higher than the riskfree rate) and an equity premium
relative to the government bill rate (lower than the equity premium relative to the riskfree
rate). It does not change the total discount rate, which is what matters for the discussion
above.
Generally, the higher is the EIS, the less the riskfree rate response to a change in the
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probability, and the lower the precautionary motive. The greater the responsiveness of
dividends, the greater the equity premium and cash flow effect combined. Section 3.7 and
Section 4 introduce dynamic models which differ in their details. However, in each of these
models, prices are subject to the same simple economic forces outlined here.
What happens empirically when the probability of a disaster increases? Using a political
science database developed for the purpose of measuring the probability of political crises,
Berkman, Jacobsen, and Lee (2011) show that an increase in the probability of a political
crisis has a large negative effect on world stock returns, with the effect size increasing in the
severity of the crisis. Thus the data clearly favor parameter values that imply a negative
relation between prices and the risk of a disaster.
3.7 Multiperiod disasters
We now return to a question raised in the previous section. In the model of Section 3.1,
disasters occur instantaneously. In the data, they unfold over several years.13 How does this
affect the model’s ability to explain the equity premium?
One simple way to model multiperiod disasters is to assume disasters are in expected
rather than realized consumption.
dCt
Ct
= µt dt+ σ dBt (21)
with
dµt = κµ(µ¯− µt) dt+ Zt dNt. (22)
In this model, consumption itself is continuous, and the normal distribution describes risks
over infinitesimal time periods. However, over a time period of any finite length, consumption
growth will exhibit fat tails. If the model in the previous section represents one extreme, this
represents another. Most likely reality is somewhere between the two in that some part of
13The average duration of the disasters in Barro and Ursu´a (2008), measured as the number of years from
consumption peak to trough, is 4.3 years. The size and duration of the disaster has a negative correlation of
-0.40.
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the disaster is instantaneous, while another part is predictable.14 Economically, this model
seems quite similar to the one in Section 3.1, and we will see that basic similarity does carry
through to the conclusions, with some twists.
An important statistic in this model is the cumulative effect of a disaster on consumption,
equal to Zt/κµ (see Appendix C). Longer disasters can be captured by lowering κµ; to
match the consumption data one would then lower Zt to keep Zt/κµ the same. Asset pricing
results remain largely unaffected by changes in the calibration that preserve the key quantity
Zt/κµ.
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The state-price density in this model has an approximate analytical solution that is exact
when the EIS is equal to one and (in a trivial sense) when utility is time-additive:16
dpit
pit−








Here, i1 = e
E[c−w], where c − w is the log consumption-wealth ratio in the economy. When
the EIS is equal to 1, i1 = β. Under time-additive utility,
1
ψ
= γ and thus the shocks to
the state-price density are the same as if there were no disasters. In a typical calibration,
where disasters unfold over years rather than decades, κµ is two orders of magnitude greater





This term, which determines the risk premium for bearing disaster risk, is approximately
invariant to changes in the consumption process that leave Zt/κµ unchanged.
14An alternative way to produce disaster clustering is to assume that the disaster probability follows a
self-exciting process, in that an occurrence of a disaster raises the probability of future disasters. Such a
model is solved in closed form by Nowotny (2011). It is also the case that, even if such a clustering is not a
property of the physical process of disasters (as it appears to be), it occurs endogenously through learning, as
shown by Gillman, Kejak, and Pakosˇ (2014). Multifrequency processes can produce dynamics that resemble
disasters (Calvet and Fisher (2007)). One can also assume that, rather than a one-time event, a disaster
represents a state in which there is some probability of entry and exit as in Nakamura, Steinsson, Barro, and
Ursu´a (2013). The conclusions we draw are robust to alternative specifications.
15This statement holds provided that κµ is “large” in a sense that will be made more precise as we go
along. In effect what is required is that we look at disasters that last for several years rather than several
decades.
16See Tsai and Wachter (2014a) for details.
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, which does not depend on τ . Therefore,
from Proposition 1 it follows that the equity premium can be approximated by











See Appendix C for the full solution to the model. Note the similarity to the equity premium
in the model we previously considered (keeping in mind that Zt/κµ represents the total size
of the disaster and is comparable to Zt in that model). The difference is that in the disaster
premium term, risk aversion is replaced by the difference between risk aversion and the
inverse of the EIS γ− 1
ψ
, and leverage is replaced by the difference between leverage and the
inverse of the EIS: φ− 1
ψ
. The presence of the EIS in these terms reflects the response of the
riskfree rate when disasters are not instantaneous. Upon the onset of a multiperiod disaster,
the riskfree rate falls. This offsets the effect of the decline in expected cash flows.
Table 2 shows the values of the equity premium and for the observed excess returns,
assuming risk aversion equal to 4, and three cases for the EIS: time-additive utility (corre-
sponding to an EIS of 1/4 in this case), unit EIS, and EIS equal to 2. We show results for
the consumption claim (φ = 1) and for a levered claim (φ = 3). We simplify our calibration
19
by considering κµ = 1, which approximately matches the duration of disasters in the data.
Thus Zt remains the cumulative effect of disasters in this model, just as in Section 3.1.
Time-additive utility implies a population equity premium that is the same as the CCAPM;
disasters do not contribute anything in this model. The observed average excess return in
a sample without disasters will actually be negative. That is because equity prices rise on
the onset of a disaster in the time-additive utility model (with leverage below risk aversion).
Investors factor this price increase into their equity premium, and thus when it does not oc-
cur, the observed return is in fact lower. In contrast, for EIS equal to 1, the premium on the
consumption claim is the same as in the CCAPM in samples with and without disasters. For
an unlevered claim with EIS equal to 1, there is no price change when a disaster occurs, and
no risk premium (other than for normal Brownian risk). For a reasonable value of leverage
(φ = 3), the model implies an equity premium of 5.15% in samples without disasters when
ψ = 1. When ψ = 2, this equity premium is 8.05%. In the data, the equity premium is
7.69%. To conclude, the model can still explain the equity premium puzzle, even if disasters
are spread over multiple periods.
4 Time-varying Risk Premia
The previous sections focused on the question of whether agents’ beliefs about rare disasters
can explain the equity premium puzzle. Another important puzzle in asset pricing is the high
level of stock market volatility. The basic endowment consumption CAPM fails to explain
this volatility: assuming (for the moment) that stock returns are not levered, consumption
volatility and return volatility should be equal. However, in postwar data consumption
growth volatility is 1.3%, while stock return volatility is 18%. Adding leverage helps a little
bit, but not very much. Dividends are more volatile than consumption, though not be
nearly enough to account for the difference between volatility of consumption and volatility
of returns. This striking difference between the volatility of cash flows and the volatility
of returns is known as the equity volatility puzzle (Shiller (1981), LeRoy and Porter (1981),
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Campbell and Shiller (1988)).17 Closely connected with the volatility puzzle is the fact that
excess stock returns are predictable by the price-dividend ratio (Cochrane (1992), Fama and
French (1989), Keim and Stambaugh (1986) and many subsequent studies). The reason is
that, in a rational, stationary, model, returns are driven by realized cash flows, expected
future cash flows, and discount rates. Empirical evidence point strongly to discount rates,
and in particular, equity premia, as being the source of this variation; and if equity premia
vary, this should be apparent in a predictive relation between the price-dividend ratio and
returns (Campbell (2003)).
The models shown so far do not help explain the equity volatility puzzle. In the iid model
of Section 3.1, disaster volatility and consumption volatility (or dividend volatility in the
levered model) are the same. Depending on the calibration, this model might have a much
greater volatility of stock returns than the consumption CAPM. However, this volatility
arises entirely from the behavior of stock returns and consumption during disasters. It says
nothing about why stock return volatility would be high in periods where no consumption
disaster has occurred. In the multiperiod disaster model of Section 3.7, stock prices fall by
more than consumption upon the onset of a disaster. In this sense, the model does have
some excess volatility. However, like the iid model, it cannot explain the volatility of stock
returns during normal times.18
To fully account for the evidence discussed above, the source of variation in returns
should be through risk premia. The disaster risk framework offers a natural mechanism
17Some have pointed out that total payouts to stockholders are themselves very volatile, and that this may
be a better measure of cash flows than dividends (Boudoukh, Michaely, Richardson, and Roberts (2007),
Larrain and Yogo (2008)). While interesting, this fact does not lead to a solution to the volatility puzzle.
A model should be able to explain both the behavior of the “dividend claim” and the behavior of the
“cash flow claim”, as both represent cash flows from a replicable portfolio strategy. Moreover, as explained
further above, excess returns are predictable by price-dividend ratios, implying that part of return volatility
comes from time-varying equity premia. Price-to-cash flow measures imply even greater evidence of return
predictability than the traditional price-dividend ratio.
18Time-variation in consumption growth can be used to explain the equity premium and normal-times
equity volatility (Bansal and Yaron (2004)). However, this mechanism, by itself, does not explain return
predictability, and it implies that consumption growth is predictable by the price-dividend ratio, which it
does not appear to be (Beeler and Campbell (2012)). The multiperiod disaster model in Section 3.7 also
implies that consumption growth is predictable by the price-dividend ratio, but only in samples in which a
disaster takes place.
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by which this can occur. Rather than being constant, the probability of a disaster might
vary over time. Consider (10): the equity premium depends directly on the probability
of a disaster. Consider also the discussion in Section 3.6. Under reasonable parameter
specifications, an increase in the disaster probability leads to a decline in the price-dividend
ratio. This reasoning suggests that such a model could account for stock market volatility
through variation in the disaster probability, as well as for the predictability in stock returns.
4.1 Time-varying probability of a disaster
A dynamic model that captures this intuition is described in Wachter (2013). Consumption
and dividends are as in Section 3.1, except that here the probability of a disaster is time-
varying:
dλt = κλ(λ¯− λt) dt+ σλ
√
λt dBλ,t, (27)
where Bλ,t is also a standard Brownian motion, assumed (for analytical convenience) to be
independent of Bt. The distribution of Zt is also assumed to not depend on λt. This process
has the desirable property that λ never falls below zero; the fact that it is technically an
intensity rather than a probability implies that the probability of a disaster can never exceed
one.19
Wachter (2013) assumes a unit EIS. Here, we generalize to any positive EIS; as in Sec-
tion 3.7 our solutions are exact in the time-additive and unit EIS case and approximate











λt dBλ,t + (e
−γZt − 1) dNt, (28)













19As in Wachter (2013), we abstract from the multiperiod nature of disasters described in Section 3.7.
In other work (Tsai and Wachter (2014b)) we consider multiperiod disasters that occur with time-varying
probability.
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where i1 = e
E[c−w], equal to β in the case of unit EIS. Note that when γ > 1, b > 0. Note
that if utility is time-additive (θ = 1), the pricing kernel does not depend on b. Otherwise,
shocks to λt are priced, even though they are uncorrelated with shocks to consumption.
The agent’s preference for the early resolution of uncertainty determines how shocks to
the disaster probability are priced, just as it determines pricing of the multiperiod disaster
shocks in Section 3.7. For example, consider γ > 1. Then a preference for early resolution
of uncertainty (γ > 1/ψ) implies 1− 1
θ
> 0. Assets that go down in price when the disaster
probability rises require an additional risk premium to compensate for disaster probability
risk. The case of γ < 1 works in a similar fashion.
The riskfree rate in this economy is equal to



























e(1−γ)Zt − 1)− (e−γZt − 1)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
constant disaster risk︸ ︷︷ ︸
time-varying disaster risk
. (30)
Relative to the iid model (11) in Section 3.4, there is an additional term that reflects precau-
tionary savings due to time-variation in λt itself. This term is zero for both time-additive




− 1). If there is a preference for
an early resolution of uncertainty, and if γ > 1 and ψ > 1, then θ < 0 and this term lowers
the riskfree rate relative to what it would be in a model with constant disaster risk.
We now turn to equity pricing. The price-dividend ratio satisfies the general pricing
equation (24). Solving the expectation (see Tsai and Wachter (2014a) for details results in







where aφ(τ) and bφ(τ) are functions available in closed form (see Appendix D for more
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details). As in Section 3.7, the value of the aggregate market is the integral of the values
of “zero-coupon equity” claims, or equity “strips”, namely assets that pay the aggregate
dividend at a specific point in time and at no other time. For a zero-coupon claim of maturity
τ , bφ(τ) determines how that claim responds to a change in the disaster probability. The
same tradeoffs that govern the comparative statics results in Section 3.6 determine how
prices respond to changes in disaster probabilities, as explained in Appendix D. We will
focus attention on the cases that lead prices to decline in the disaster probability, namely
such that the risk premium and expected cash flow effects outweigh the riskfree rate effect.
Allowing the probability of the disaster to vary has implications both for the average
(long-run) equity premium, and for the variability of the equity premium. Putting (31)
together with (28) and Proposition 1 implies that the equity premium is given by











(e−γZt − 1)(1− eφZt)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
constant disaster risk︸ ︷︷ ︸
time-varying disaster risk
. (32)
The expression for the equity premium has two components from the iid model (10), plus





b is positive in
the case where there is a preference for early resolution of uncertainty. Because we are
considering preference parameters such that the aggregate market goes down in price when
the disaster probability rises, then the equity premium will be higher than in the iid model
of Section 3.1.
To quantitatively assess the model, we simulate 600,000 years of data to obtain population
moments, and also 100,000 samples of 65 years to represent the postwar data. We separately
report statistics for those samples that do not contain disasters as these are the relevant
comparisons. Table 3 shows the expected bond return, bond return volatility, the equity
premium, stock return volatility, and the Sharpe ratio on the market for six calibrations:
We consider three values of the EIS (ψ = 1/3, 1 and 2) and for each of these cases assuming
both constant and time-varying disaster probability. We set risk aversion γ = 3; thus ψ = 1/3
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refers to time-additive utility. Parameter values are reported in the caption of Table 3.20
When ψ = 1 and 2, and when disaster risk is time-varying, the model is capable of
matching the high equity premium, high equity volatility and a low and smooth Treasury
Bill rate in the data.21 To understand where these results come from, we first discuss the
constant disaster risk case and the time-additive utility case for comparison.
The constant disaster risk case is the model discussed in Section 3.1, though the parameter
values are slightly different (specifically, risk aversion and the discount rate are lower, and
there is leverage). We see that this model is capable of generating a low Treasury Bill rate and
a reasonable equity premium. However, the model cannot generate reasonable stock return
volatility because the volatility of stock returns is the same as the volatility of dividends.
Now consider the time-varying disaster risk case under time-additive utility. Even though
disaster risk varies over time, equity returns are no more volatile in this case than in the
constant disaster risk case, and in fact the equity premium is slightly lower. Equity returns
are not more volatile because, under this calibration (leverage equals risk aversion), the
riskfree rate, risk premium, and cash flow effects exactly cancel. Even if risk aversion were
20Details of the calibration are as follows: normal-times consumption parameters µc and σc are set to match
the postwar data. Leverage φ is set to 3, a standard value in the literature (Bansal and Yaron (2004)). Rather
than assuming Dt = C
φ
t , we follow Bansal and Yaron in assuming the more realistic specification
dDt
Dt−
= µD dt+ φσ dBt + σi dBit
where Bit is a Brownian motion independent of Bt. We chose µD = 0.04 to match the average price-
dividend ratio in the data (note that share repurchases suggest expected dividend growth in the data may
not accurately measure investors long-term expectations of dividend growth). We chose “idiosyncratic”
dividend volatility σi = 0.05 so that measured dividend volatility in no-disaster samples in the model equals
dividend volatility in postwar U.S. data. We assume that there is a 40% probability of default on government
bills in the case of a disaster. The time-varying disaster risk parameters κλ and σλ are of course not directly
observable. The existence of the likelihood function imposes tight constraints on these parameters so in
practice there is a single free parameter that must do its best to match both the volatility of stock returns,
the persistence of the price-dividend ratio, and the volatility of Treasury Bill returns. See Section B of the
online Appendix for more details.
21One concern about high values of the EIS is that generate a counterfactual relation between the riskfree
rate and consumption growth in Hall (1988) regressions (see the discussion in Beeler and Campbell (2012)).
These regressions use two stage least squares to identify the EIS, and thus require some predictability in
consumption growth. In the model above, there is no predictability in consumption growth and thus running
regressions in samples without disasters will replicate the data finding of a small and insignificant EIS. Of
course, this should not be taken as license to make the EIS arbitrarily high, since such a model might deliver
counterfactual predictions in a realistic extension with a small amount of consumption growth predictability.
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to slightly exceed leverage, equity returns would still not be sufficiently volatile, and if risk
aversion were lower than leverage, the model would generate return predictability of the
incorrect sign. At first glance it is surprising that the measured equity premium is slightly
lower in no-disaster simulations in the time-varying case. After all, in the constant case, in
the no-disaster simulations, the measured equity premium is lower because disasters have
not in fact been realized. In the time-varying case, this result is offset by a second sample
selection problem. Samples without disasters tend to have a lower probability of disaster
and hence, in this model, a lower equity premium.
Finally consider the time-varying case when the EIS is greater than or equal to one. In
these cases, equity volatility is greater in the time-varying disaster case because the risk
premium (and cash flow) effect exceeds the riskfree rate effect. Indeed, the Treasury Bill
return is less volatile in these cases than in the time-additive utility case. Meanwhile, the
equity premium is higher because of the extra compensation required for assets that fall in
times when the disaster probability is high.
Given that the mechanism is through a time-varying risk premium, the model also ex-
plains the ability of price-dividend ratios to predict future excess stock returns (Wachter
(2013)). Moreover, consumption growth will not be predictable, as in the data. One limita-
tion of this model is that it does not predict as much volatility of the price-dividend ratio as
in the data. The model can come close to matching this volatility in population, and in the
full set of simulations, but the volatility is lower (0.21 vs 0.43 in the data) in the simulations
without rare disasters. This in part arises from the particular functional form imposed above,
which imposes tight restrictions on the volatility of the disaster process. Richer models for
the disaster probability process can overcome these problems (Seo and Wachter (2015)).
The key claim of this model is that asset prices during normal times are driven by the
time-varying tail behavior. Investor expectations about this tail behavior are of course hard
to capture, but recent work has made progress in this regard. Bollerslev and Todorov (2011)
use option prices and high-frequency data to determine investor beliefs about tail risk, and
premia investors assign to tail events. Their model-free measures find that the risk premia
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that can be attributed to tail events is a large fraction of the total equity premium, and
that this premium is strongly varying over time. Kelly and Jiang (2014) assume that tails of
individual asset returns follow a power law, with parameters determined by overall market
tail behavior. This structure allows them to estimate the probability of an overall market
disaster from individual stock returns. They show that their disaster measure captures risk
premia, in that it has strong predictive power for excess stock returns. They also show
that tail risk determines the cross-section in that stocks that covary more with the their
time-varying tail risk measure have high expected returns. Chabi-Yo, Ruenzi, and Weigert
(2014) use high-frequency data to measure disaster risk and come to similar conclusions, as
do Gao and Song (2013) and Gao, Song, and Yang (2014) who use data on a wide cross-
section of options to construct a disaster-risk measure. Disaster risk can also be measured
by news articles using text-based analysis (Manela and Moreira (2013)) and using data on
credit-default swaps (Seo (2014)). These empirical findings offer direct confirmation of the
mechanism in the model above. A related finding is that investors’ lifetime experience of
disasters affects their allocation of stocks years later (Malmendier and Nagel (2011)). Though
technically outside of this representative-agent framework, this finding is very much in the
spirit of the model in that it shows the strong hold that rare events can have on investor
attitudes.22
4.2 Time-varying Resilience
An alternative mechanism for generating time-varying risk premia is to allow the sensitivity
of cash flows to a disaster to vary. This mechanism is introduced by Gabaix (2012), who
makes use of linearity-generating processes, defined in Gabaix (2008), to obtain simple and
elegant solutions for prices.
Following Gabaix (2012), consider the discrete-time equivalent of (5), except with the
22One study that takes heterogeneity in beliefs into account is Chen, Joslin, and Tran (2012). Challenges in
modeling disagreements about rare events include counterparty risk: namely, can optimistic agents commit
to insuring pessimistic ones in the event of a disaster, and the well-known problem in heterogeneous-agent
models of non-stationary equilibria (optimistic agents, over time, take over the economy).
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 0 if there is no disaster at t+ 1Zt+1 if there is a disaster at t+ 1 (33)




= µD + log(1 + 
D
t+1) +
 0 if there is no disaster at t+ 1Zd,t+1 if there is a disaster at t+ 1 (34)
where Zd,t+1 is the response of dividends to the disaster and 
D
t+1 > −1 has mean zero and









which is equivalent to assuming time-additive utility. The distribution for Zd,t+1 and the
disaster intensity are jointly specified using a quantity Ht, called resilience:
Ht = λtEν
[
e−γZt+1+Zd,t+1 − 1] (35)
where λt is the disaster probability and the expectation is taken over the disaster distribu-
tions. The process for Ht is given by





e−φHHˆt + Ht+1, (37)
where Ht+1 is mean zero and uncorrelated with 
D
t+1 and the disaster event. These assumptions
23Gabaix (2012) allows for the possibility that dividends are completely wiped out in a disaster; for
notational convenience we can allow for this possibility by formally setting eZd = 0.
28












where h∗ = log(1 + H∗) and δ = β − µD − h∗. Assumptions (34–37) are designed to ensure
this linearity. Comparing this model with the previous one, one sees an example of a general
principle, which is that there is a trade-off in the complexity of assumptions versus the
complexity of the conclusions. The model in Section 4.1 has relatively simple assumptions
on economic fundamentals, and results in prices that are an integral of exponential functions.
This model has more complex processes for fundamentals but implies that prices are linear
functions.24
Like the model in Section 4.1, this model also implies that risk premia vary over time,
and thus that excess stock returns are predictable. The mechanism, however, is different.
Gabaix (2012) focuses on the case with constant probability in (35), so the main calibration
of his model is equivalent to one with time-varying exposure to a disaster. Low market
values correspond to periods of high exposure to a constant level of disaster risk. Because
disaster exposure is high, risk premia are high. Thus excess stock returns are predictable as
in the data. The reason for this focus, perhaps, is the assumption of time-additive utility.
Under this assumption, variation in the probability of a disaster will help little in matching
the data, and may hurt, because the riskfree rate effect will be large in comparison to the
risk premium effect and cash flow effect.25
24Which one is preferable as a modeling strategy will likely depend on the application. One issue is the
utility function: while Gabaix (2012) shows that linearity-generating processes can be generalized to non-
time-additive utility functions, this comes at the cost of greater complexity. A second question is whether
evaluating the model involves simulation and what quantities are necessary to calculate; it is more convenient
to calculate prices as linear functions, but more convenient to simulate from the model in Section 4.1. Stability
and the absence of arbitrage require conditions on the shocks Ht+1 and 
D
t+1. Provided that these conditions
are met, the distribution of prices will not be affected by the distributional assumptions on these shocks.
However, any quantity that is not a price (such as a return) will be affected. Thus to simulate quantities other
than prices from this model one must take a stand on the distribution for these shocks; simple distributional
assumptions will generally not be sufficient because of the required conditions.
25This can be seen directly from (35); an increase in the probability of a disaster will increase resilience
if Eν
[
e−γZt+1+Zd,t+1 − 1] > 0, namely if risk aversion is high relative to leverage. This increase will raise
prices, at the same time that it raises risk premia.
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5 Alternative asset classes
The previous sections focused the implications of disaster risk on stock returns and short-
term bonds, while briefly touching on the literature linking disaster risk to the cross-section.
Here, we discuss models that account for puzzles in other asset classes.
5.1 Fixed income
Like excess stock returns, excess returns on long-term bonds over short-term bonds are also
predictable (Campbell and Shiller (1991), Stambaugh (1988), Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005)).
Moreover, excess bond returns are positive on average, leading to an upward-sloping yield
curve. Gabaix (2012) and Tsai (2014) write down models explaining these results. Inflation,
and thus low realized returns on bonds occur frequently in disasters. Thus, by the logic
of Proposition 1, nominal bonds will carry a disaster premium because of their inflation
exposure. If this premium varies over time because of time-varying inflation exposure (as
Gabaix assumes) or because the probability of an inflation disaster varies (as Tsai assumes),
then bond returns will be predictable. Moreover, as Tsai shows, bond and stock risk premia
need not move together, because fears of an inflation disaster need not coincide with a
disaster affecting stock returns. This lack of co-movement poses a puzzle for preference-
based theories of time-varying risk premia (see discussions in Duffee (2013) and Lettau and
Wachter (2011)).
Rare disasters can also help account for the puzzling size of the default spread, as com-
pared to actual defaults, as shown in models of capital structure choice in the presence of
rare disasters (Bhamra and Strebulaev (2011), Gourio (2013)).
5.2 Options
By making use of the tight connection between the Merton (1976) model and the iid disaster
model in Section 3.1, Backus, Chernov, and Martin (2011) derive an elegant method for
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backing out the distribution of consumption disasters implied by the prices of equity index
options. Their method makes use of the fact that, in an iid model, stock returns and
consumption returns move one-to-one with each other. Moreover, because of their non-
linear payoff structure, options provide a means of determining the risk neutral distribution
of stock returns. Finally, by assuming a representative agent with constant relative risk
aversion and choosing risk aversion to match the equity premium, Backus et al. can create
a mapping from the risk-neutral distribution to the physical distribution.
The distribution of consumption growth implied by options, according to this method,
looks very different from the distribution assumed in Section 3.1. Specifically, Backus, Cher-
nov, and Martin (2011) show that options imply “disasters” in consumption that are much
smaller, and also much more likely. A normal distribution for consumption growth is still
clearly rejected, and yet the distribution looks nothing like the distribution of macroeco-
nomic disasters. Backus et al. note that their calibration can be seen as an alternative
disaster calibration to that of Section 3.1: namely an alternative calibration of the same
model that can also explain the equity premium, but, unlike the model in Section 3.1, can
also explain option returns (for, just as the implied consumption distribution looks very dif-
ferent than the international macro distribution of disasters, the option prices implied by the
model of Section 3.1 look very different from options in the data). One difficulty with this
interpretation of their findings is that their consumption distribution is inconsistent with
postwar consumption data. For the same reason consumption growth cannot be normally
distributed with a volatility of 3.5%, given the 65 years of postwar data, it is also not possible
for consumption to be subject to frequent, small “disasters”; such disasters would have been
observed and are inconsistent with the measured volatility of consumption growth. One is
thus forced to conclude that their interpretation of options data is a serious challenge to the
model in Section 3.1.
However, these results do not necessarily pose a challenge to the models in Section 4.1.26
26Du (2011) also shows that an iid disaster risk model has difficulty accounting for options data, but a
model with both disaster risk and external habit formation utility as in Campbell and Cochrane (1999) can
account for these data.
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Seo and Wachter (2015) solve for option prices in the model in Section 4.1 and in a multi-
factor extension. They show that, contrary to the model in Section 3.1, these models can
reconcile international macro data, and hence the disaster-risk explanation of the equity
premium, with option prices. This is surprising because allowing disaster risk to vary changes
conditional, but not unconditional moments of the consumption distribution. Previous work
has shown that the implied volatility smile is mainly driven by unconditional moments. Why
then does allowing disaster risk to vary make a difference?
The reason is that the model in Section 4.1 can explain the volatility of stock returns
outside of disasters while the model in Section 3.1 does not. Unlike reduced-form models in
which the volatility of stock returns is an exogenous input, the disaster-risk models produce
volatility endogenously. The level as well as the slope of the implied volatility curve reflects
the fact that stock returns have high normal-times volatility, as well as a non-lognormal
distribution. Given smooth consumption and dividend data, this is not consistent with an
iid model.
Finally, a large and growing literature assesses the impact of disaster risk on the carry
trade in foreign currency and in currency option returns. Due to space constraints we will
not discuss this literature here, but rather refer the reader to Verdelhan (2015).
6 Production economies
The endowment economies above jointly specify agent preferences and endowments. It is
more realistic to consider consumption as a choice variable, however. Thus an important
question in considering representative agent models is whether the hypothesized consumption
(and dividend) process is consistent with the deeper notion of general equilibrium defined
by a model with production. Considering production economies also offers the promise of
explaining correlations between the stock market and real variables such as investment and
unemployment.
In this section of our survey we will follow the literature and assume a discrete-time
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(Epstein and Zin (1989), Weil (1990)). Here, it is more convenient to define the stochastic



















so that for an asset with return Rt+1 from 1 to t + 1, the agent’s first-order condition (or
equivalently, no-arbitrage) implies
Et[Mt+1Rt+1] = 1. (41)
6.1 Constant disaster risk models
Two models with endogenous consumption choice are considered by Barro (2009). In the




where α is between 0 and 1. In this model, assumptions on the endowment process are




= µ+ t+1 +
 0 if there is no disaster at t+ 1Zt+1 if there is a disaster at t+ 1, (43)
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where t+1 is an iid normal shock. We modify (39) by replacing Ct with period utility that
allows for preferences over leisure:
Ut = Ct(1− Lt)χ. (44)
This modification is not without consequence. When consumption is replaced by (44), ψ can
no longer be interpreted as the EIS. However, the EIS is still greater than one if and only if
ψ > 1 (Gourio (2012)).
In this model with no investment, consumption Ct is equal to output Yt. The wage is
equal to the marginal product of labor,
wt = αYt/Lt = αCt/Lt, (45)
Setting marginal benefit equal to marginal cost leads to the labor supply function27








Substituting into (46) implies that, in equilibrium Lt =
α
α+χ
. Surprisingly perhaps, hours
worked are constant, despite the fact that productivity fluctuates. A disaster leads to a
fall in productivity, which leads to lower consumption and lower wages. These two effects
exactly offset so that hours worked remain the same. Equation (42) implies that consumption
behaves exactly as in the model of Section 3.1. Dividends are given by
Dt = Yt − wtLt = Yt − αCt = (1− α)Ct,
27Specifically, taking partial derivatives in (44) leads to
Ctχ(1− Lt)χ−1 = wt(1− Lt)χ.
Rearranging yields (46).
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where we have substituted in from the labor supply function. Thus dividends are proportional
to consumption, and also fall by the same percentage in a disaster. Furthermore, because
Lt is a constant, the stochastic discount factor is still given by (40).
It follows from the Euler equation then that the equity premium in this model is exactly
the same as the equity premium on the consumption claim in the model of Section 3.1.
Moreover, because the consumption process and stochastic discount factor are the same, the
riskfree rate will be the same as well. Thus the model’s ability to explain the equity premium
is preserved under this model with endogenous consumption.
Barro (2009) presents a second model with endogenous consumption, where, rather than
labor choice, there is capital and investment. Output is given by
Yt = AKt, (47)
where Kt is the capital stock. Unlike the model above, productivity, A is constant. Con-
sumption satisfies
Ct = Yt − It = AKt − It,
where It is investment, and capital evolves according to
Kt+1 = Kt + It − δt+1Kt,
where δt+1 is stochastic depreciation. In this model, disasters are represented by destruction
of capital, modeled as a shock to depreciation:
δt = δ +
 0 if there is no disaster at t1− eZt if there is a disaster at t. (48)
The link between disasters and capital destruction seems most direct in the case of wars.
However, one could also interpret capital more broadly, as including intangibles such as
employee or customer value. Moreover, economic crises may lead to re-allocations that make
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certain kinds of capital worthless (see the discussion in Gourio (2012)).
Because output can be either consumed or costlessly reinvested, a standard formula
applies for the gross return to capital:
RSt+1 = 1 + A− δt+1. (49)
In this model, the expected return on unlevered equity is the same as the expected return
on capital, and is determined by (49). Consumption, and thus investment, is determined by
the Euler equation (41). Contrast this with the endogenous labor choice model, in which
consumption is immediately determined from output, given that labor supplied is a constant,
and the expected return on equity is then determined from the Euler equation.
In this model, investment is determined by the disaster probability. Let ζ be the fraction
of capital that is invested. Based on the resource constraint Ct = (A − ζ)Kt and the Euler










e(1−γ)Zt − 1]+ Terms that do not depend on λ
(see the Online Appendix). Recall that Zt < 0, so the term inside the expectation is positive
when γ > 1 and negative when γ < 1. On the one hand, a greater probability of disaster
lowers wealth and leads agents to invest more (the income effect). However, there is now a
greater chance that any investment will be lost in a disaster; that depresses investment (the
substitution effect). When ψ > 1, it is the latter effect dominates, and a greater probability
of disaster lowers investment (in a comparative static sense). When ψ < 1, the former effect
dominates.
Note that the constant investment ratio implies that Ct suffers the same percent decline
as capital in the event of a disaster. It follows from (48) that the first-order implications
of this model for consumption and therefore the riskfree rate are the same as in the iid
endowment economy model of Section 3.1. Furthermore, the first-order implications for the
equity premium because of the equation for the capital return (49).
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What happens when there is both capital and labor? Gabaix (2011) and Gourio (2012)





If a disaster affects capital Kt and productivity At by the same amount, then the risk
premium on the consumption claim is the same as that in the endowment economy with
constant disaster risk. Consumption and the riskfree rate are also the same (also, hours
worked do not change in a disaster). During normal times, macro quantities follow the same
dynamics as in a model without disasters, though the level of investment and consumption
relative to capital will be different.
These results demonstrate that the insights of the iid model in Section 3.1 are not de-
pendent on the assumption of the endowment economy. That is, the basic mechanism
linking disasters to the equity premium survives a model of endogenous consumption; in this
sense this explanation is more robust than competing explanations of the equity premium
(Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer (2010), Lettau and Uhlig (2000)).
6.2 Time-varying disaster risk models
As Section 4 shows, many interesting questions in asset pricing lie outside the reach of iid
models. Can the insights of dynamic endowment economies be extended to models with
production? The literature on dynamic production economies without disasters (e.g. Jer-
mann (1998), Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001), Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer (2010))
illustrates the many challenges that this research agenda faces. For example, mechanisms
that lead to procyclical investment lead to countercyclical dividends, and thus imply a very
low equity premium. Indeed, one of the reasons that constant disaster risk models with
production in Section 6.1 are successful in explaining the equity premium is that they do
not rely on dynamics in productivity or preferences to generate an equity premium. Yet
extending the insights of the dynamic endowment economies to production economies is a
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crucial step in building our understanding of links between finance and the macroeconomy,
and in obtaining a deeper understanding of financial markets themselves.
Gourio (2012) presents a production-based model with adjustment costs in which the
probability of a rare disaster varies over time, as in Wachter (2013). In Gourio’s model,
output is still determined by (50), with disasters still having the same proportional affect
on capital and productivity. Gourio also assumes an EIS of 2 and a risk aversion of 3.8.
Because the EIS is greater than one, the substitution effect will dominate the income effect,
and, because of the preference for early resolution of uncertainty, assets exposed to the risk
of disaster will carry an additional risk premium (Section 4.1).
The main implication of Gourio’s (2012) model is that investment falls when the prob-
ability of a rare disaster rises. Gourio has two mechanisms that combine to achieve this
result. First, investment declines as a fraction of output as described in the comparative
statics analysis of Section 6.1. Second, adjustment costs create a wedge between the value
of a unit of investment within the firm and outside the firm. This wedge is smaller when the
disaster probability is high, so there is less incentive to invest in this case. Thus Gourio’s
model can explain several important puzzles in macroeconomics that are related to invest-
ment. That is, the model explains why investment and output are much more volatile than
consumption, and why these variables are imperfectly correlated. Furthermore, equity prices
decline when the probability of a disaster increases, as in the model of Section 4.1. Thus the
model can explain empirical correlations between investment and stock prices.
One real-world aspect of recessions that is missing from the Gourio (2012) model is
unemployment. The model does produce variation in hours worked. However, agents do
not decrease hours when the probability of a disaster rises because they cannot find jobs.
Rather it is because they increase consumption (because they decrease investment), and
consumption and leisure are complements. While agents are not happy when the disaster
probability rises (it is a high marginal utility state), they are working their optimal number
of hours.28
28The model implication that consumption rises when the disaster probability falls also seems like it might
be counterfactual. However, this is not obvious as the probability of a disaster is not observable to the
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A second difficulty with the Gourio (2012) model lies in its implications for stock market
volatility. When the disaster probability rises in this model, investment and profits fall, and
because investment falls by more than profits, dividends. This increase in dividends offsets
the decrease in prices due to time-variation in the disaster probability. Thus the volatility on
the unlevered claim is very low – lower than the volatility of output itself (Gourio (2009)). For
this reason, Gourio (2012) assumes a high degree of leverage: firms issue debt in proportion
to capital stock and there is default in the event of disaster with a low recovery rate. The
levered claim in the model is realistically volatile. However, the leverage required to achieve
this result appears to be significantly higher than that found in the data (50% versus 30%).
Moreover, it appears that the unlevered market also appears to have a significant amount
of volatility in the data (Larrain and Yogo (2008)), casting doubt on the theory that stock
market volatility is entirely driven by leverage.
Petrosky-Nadeau, Zhang, and Kuehn (2013) also present a production model with a
time-varying probability of disasters. They assume a production function with labor only,
as in the first model in Section 6.1 but with α = 1. Unlike in that frictionless model,
hiring is subject to search frictions as in Diamond (1982) and Mortensen and Pissarides
(1994). Their model has the appealing feature that consumption disasters arise even though
shocks to productivity are normally distributed. Thus their model provides a mechanism
through which ordinary shocks can endogenously lead to disasters. Their model also explains
the volatility of unemployment and job vacancies. Moreover, the model implies that labor
market tightness is driven by the probability of a disaster, and thus should predict stock
returns. This is born out in the data.
Three assumptions lie behind the ability of the Petrosky-Nadeau, Zhang, and Kuehn
(2013) model to produce endogenous disasters. First, wages are high and rigid, so a de-
cline in output leads to a greater-than-proportional decline in dividends (in contrast to the
investment-based model of Gourio (2012)). Petrosky-Nadeau et al. further assume a high
econometrician, and Gaussian fluctuations in productivity generate realistic consumption and investment
correlations. Moreover, while consumption rises on impact, it then falls back to its steady state. Gourio
(2012) describes some modifications to the model that would reduce this positive effect.
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separation rate, and a fixed component in the marginal cost of vacancies. In effect, it costs
more to post a vacancy when labor conditions are slack and thus when output is low. As
a result, firms do not hire, and output falls still more. Thus a sequence of small shocks
to output can lead, through this mechanism, to a large drop in output which resembles a
disaster.
While it is advantageous to have a model that explains disasters, the Petrosky-Nadeau,
Zhang, and Kuehn (2013) model’s reliance on these three assumptions is a limitation. In
particular, the last two assumptions are non-standard. The assumption that posting a
vacancy is more expensive in bad times than in good times does not appear to have empirical
support, and is difficult to interpret economically. The assumption of a high separation rate
is contradicted by the data (in the data, the separation rate is 3% rather than 5%). A second
limitation of this model, like that of Gourio (2012), lies in the implications for stock market
volatility. The volatility of stock returns in the model is 11%, compared to an unlevered
volatility of 13%. However, this is in simulated data that includes disasters. As shown in
Table 3, stock return volatility tends to be higher in samples with disasters than in samples
without. This, along with the endogenous consumption distribution in their sample, raises
the question of whether their model can account for the combination of low volatility of
consumption and output and high volatility of stock returns that characterizes the postwar
period.
The models discussed in this section incorporate a time-varying probability of disaster risk
to help resolve deep puzzles in macroeconomics, such as the level of normal-times volatility in
investment and in unemployment. While the level of stock market volatility remains a puzzle,
the rate of progress shown by these papers suggests that changing expectations of disasters
have an important role in our understanding of the stock market, the macroeconomy and
the links between the two.
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7 Conclusion
We argue in this review that disaster risk offers a coherent and parsimonious framework
for understanding asset pricing puzzles. These include the equity premium, riskfree rate
and volatility puzzles, as well as puzzles in fixed income and option markets. We also show
that the disaster risk framework survives a transfer from endowment models to production
models, which endogenize the consumption and dividend processes that are taken as given
in the endowment framework.
One question that frequently arises in the setting of rare events is the appropriateness of
the assumption of a rational expectations equilibrium. A rational expectations equilibrium
assumes that agents know the probabilities with which all events can occur and can also fore-
cast prices in all states of the world. This has always been somewhat of a heroic assumption
in economics, and never more so in the case of rare events. Some authors relaxed this as-
sumption (for example, Weitzman (2007), Collin-Dufresne, Johannes, and Lochstoer (2013));
a theme that emerges from this literature is that the uncertainty and learning strengthen
the results that we report.
Disaster risk explanations involve a certain amount of technical modeling, but they are
intuitive. For example, the equity premium puzzle comes down to a question about why
investors do not desire to hold more equities; according to the disaster risk explanation it
is because they are concerned about equity performance in what might be a second Great
Depression. Another question is why time-varying risk premia (and thus excess volatility)
persists, when investors can simply hold more equities in response to greater risk premia.
According to the disaster risk explanation, this is when investors most fear disasters. Thus
disaster risk is part of a broader class of models (see Hansen (2007)) whose goal is endowing
agents with something like the uncertainty faced by actual agents making real-world deci-




A Proof of Proposition 1
Proof of Proposition 1 S is the price of the asset that pays a continuous dividend stream
















































































































(eZpi+ZS − 1)] du) .
(A.7)
The second and the third terms on the right-hand side of (A.7) are martingales. Therefore,
the first term in (A.7) must also be a martingale, and it follows that the integrand of this
term must equal zero:









eZpi+ZS − 1] = 0, (A.8)





− rt = −σpi,tσ>S,t − λt
(
Eν [(e
Zpi+ZS − 1)]− Eν [eZpi − 1]
)
.
Add both sides by λtEν [e
ZS − 1], and use the definition of rS, we get
rSt − rt = −σpi,tσ>S,t − λt
(
Eν [(e
Zpi+ZS − 1)]− Eν [eZpi − 1]− Eν [eZS − 1]
)
= −σpi,tσ>S,t − λtEν [(eZpi − 1)(eZS − 1)] (A.9)
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B Utility
We specify the preferences of the representative agent using a non-time-additive generaliza-
tion of constant relative risk aversion. The form of the utility function that we use is from
Epstein and Zin (1989), developed for continuous time by Duffie and Epstein (1992). Utility




f(Cs, Vs) ds, (B.1)
where






ψ − ((1− γ)V ) 1θ
((1− γ)V ) 1θ−1 , (B.2)
and θ = (1− γ)/(1− 1
ψ
). For ψ = 1, we assume
f(C, V ) = β(1− γ)V
(
logC − 1
1− γ log((1− γ)V )
)
. (B.3)
Here, β > 0 is the rate of time preference and γ > 0 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion.29
The parameter ψ is commonly interpreted as the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
and we will refer follow convention and refer to it as such. However, the nomenclature is
misleading, since it will not in fact represent the sensitivity of consumption to changes in
interest rates in the models we consider (though it play a principle role in controlling the
sensitivity of consumption to changes in interest rates). When 1/ψ = γ, the recursion is
linear and these equations collapse to time-additive utility.











29Note that this form of the utility function does not assume f(C, V ) has the interpretation of period
utility.
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C Details for the multiperiod model (Section 3.7)
In this model, aggregate consumption growth is assumed to follow the process
dCt
Ct
= µt dt+ σ dBt (C.1)
with
dµt = κµ(µ¯− µt) dt+ Zt dNt. (C.2)
To calculate the long-run impact of a shock Zt, we assume that Nt = 1, and that there are
no other shocks before some future time t+ τ . Then µs evolves according to
dµs = κµ(µ¯− µs) ds t < s ≤ t+ τ.
Therefore µt+τ = µ¯+Zte
−κµτ . It follows that the difference in expected consumption growth
with and without the disaster equals:














Taking the limit as τ goes to infinity implies that Zt/κµ is the long-run impact of a shock
on consumption.
As in any dynamic model, returns are potentially sensitive to the timing of dividend
payments. For this reason, we do not assume Dt = C
φ
t (which implies a mean of dividend




= (µ¯D + φ(µt − µ¯)) dt+ φσ dBt.
The full solution for the price-dividend ratio (which is exact in the case of time-additive
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This expression seems complicated, but conceptually it is relatively simple. Equity value is
a integral (sum) of discounted future dividends as in (24). The total decline is a weighted
average of the decline in each of the terms in the integral. Equity prices fall on the onset
of a disaster if and only if each term in the integral falls, which occurs if and only if φ >
1/ψ.30 That is, leverage must exceed the inverse of the EIS. For κµ relatively large, (C.3) is















Each term on the right hand side is lower than the corresponding term on the left hand side if and only if
bφ(τ) > 0, namely if and only if φ > 1/ψ.
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This result, combined with Proposition 1 implies the results in the main text.
D Details for the model with time-varying probability of disaster
(Section 4.1)







These functions satisfy ordinary differential equations










































e(1−γ)Zt − 1)+ e(φ−γ)Zt − 1] . (D.2)
with boundary conditions aφ(0) = bφ(0) = 0. The system (D.1-D.2) has a closed-form
solution (see Wachter (2013)).
Note that if the last two terms in this differential equation (D.2) were zero, then bφ(τ)
would be identically zero, the price-dividend ratio would be a constant, and there would
be no excess volatility or return predictability. We therefore seek to understand when the
sum of these terms is negative, the empirically relevant case. We can recover these terms by


















e(1−γ)Zt − 1)+ e(φ−γ)Zt − 1] (D.3)
31The precise connection between the sign of b′φ(0) and the dynamic behavior of the price-dividend ratio
is discussed by Wachter (2013).
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eφZt − 1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected dividend growth
. (D.4)
Equation (D.4) shows that for time-additive utility and for ψ = 1, the trade-offs determining
whether prices rise or fall in response to changes in the disaster probability are exactly the
same as the comparative statics result in Section 3.6 (for ψ 6= 1 and ψ 6= 1/γ, there is a
slight difference arising from the additional term in the riskfree rate expression).
This closed-form analysis illustrates the features of a calibration that are likely to explain
stock market data. First, it almost goes without saying that some risk aversion will be
necessary to achieve an equity premium. In order to generate sufficient stock market volatility
along with a low and stable riskfree rate, it is helpful to have dividends that are more
responsive to disasters than consumption (φ > 1), a relatively high EIS (ψ ≥ 1), and,
separately, a preference for early resolution of uncertainty (γ > 1/ψ).
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Figure 1: Distribution of consumption declines in the event of a disaster
Panel A: All countries














Panel B: OECD countries














Notes: Histograms show the distribution of large consumption declines (1− eZ) in percent-
ages. Panel A shows data for 24 countries, 17 of which are OECD countries and seven of
which are not; Panel B shows data for the subsample of OECD countries. Data are from
Barro and Ursua (2008). The cut-off for the definition of a disaster is 15%.
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Table 1: Rates of return for the i.i.d. model
No disaster No default Default
Panel A: Treasury Bill return
Time-additive utility (ψ = 1/4) 10.64 -3.36 -0.25
ψ = 1 4.89 -2.87 0.23
ψ = 2 3.93 -2.79 0.31
Panel B: Equity premium, population
ψ = 1/4, 1, 2 0.06 7.22 4.36
Panel C: Equity premium, observed
ψ = 1/4, 1, 2 0.06 7.82 4.72
Notes: The table shows the rate of return on the government bill (Panel A), the population
equity premium (Panel B) and the equity premium that would be observed in a sample
without disasters (Panel C). Parameters (in annual terms) are as follows: disaster probability
λ = 0.0218; discount rate β = 0.03; risk aversion γ = 4; normal-times consumption growth
µ = 0.0195, and volatility σ = 0.0125; leverage φ = 1; and (when applicable) default
probability conditional on disaster q = 0.4. For T-Bill returns in the case with default, we
report the yield (equivalently, the return if default is not realized). All the results are in
annual percentage terms.
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Table 2: The equity premium in the multiperiod disaster model
Consumption claim (φ = 1) Dividend claim (φ = 3)
Population EP Observed EP Population EP Observed EP
Time-additive utility (ψ = 1/4) 0.06 -6.13 0.19 -0.73
ψ = 1 0.06 0.06 4.19 5.15
ψ = 2 2.69 3.01 6.94 8.05
Notes: The equity premium for the consumption and dividend claim in the multiperiod
disaster model. Column 2 and 3 report the population equity premium and the equity
premium that would be observed in a sample without disasters for the consumption claim
(φ = 1), and Column 4 and 5 report premiums for the dividend claim (φ = 3). Parameters
are as follows: disaster probability λ = 0.0218, discount rate β = 0.01, risk aversion γ = 4,
normal time consumption and dividend growth µ = µD = 0.0195, volatility σ = 0.0125,
mean-reversion parameter in the µt process κµ = 1. All the results are in annual percentage
terms.
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Table 3: Return moments in the time-varying disaster probability model
Time-varying disaster probability Constant disaster probability
No-disaster simulations No-disaster simulations
Data 0.05 0.50 0.95 Pop. 0.05 0.50 0.95 Pop.
Panel A: Time-additive utility (ψ = 1/3)
E[Rb] 1.24 0.08 3.55 5.26 1.79 1.93 1.93 1.93 1.69
σ(Rb) 2.57 1.51 3.03 6.00 6.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.89
E[Re −Rb] 7.69 1.51 3.79 7.40 4.15 3.98 5.35 6.73 4.25
σ(Re) 17.72 5.71 6.68 7.69 11.58 5.72 6.68 7.68 11.65
Sharpe ratio 0.44 0.23 0.57 1.13 0.36 0.59 0.80 1.04 0.36
Panel B: ψ = 1
E[Rb] 1.24 -0.04 1.48 2.22 0.58 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.56
σ(Rb) 2.57 0.65 1.31 2.65 3.78 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.90
E[Re −Rb] 7.69 4.74 7.04 10.65 7.17 3.93 5.28 6.63 4.13
σ(Re) 17.72 10.75 15.05 21.34 19.73 5.65 6.60 7.61 11.58
Sharpe ratio 0.44 0.35 0.47 0.61 0.36 0.59 0.80 1.04 0.36
Panel C: ψ = 2
E[Rb] 1.24 -0.80 0.61 1.29 -0.27 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.28
σ(Rb) 2.57 0.60 1.20 2.45 3.68 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.88
E[Re −Rb] 7.69 5.50 7.91 11.83 8.19 3.91 5.26 6.64 4.16
σ(Re) 17.72 12.04 17.13 24.60 22.07 5.64 6.58 7.57 11.48
Sharpe ratio 0.44 0.36 0.47 0.59 0.37 0.59 0.80 1.04 0.36
Notes: Parameters are as follows: average disaster probability λ¯ = 0.0218, discount rate
β = 0.01, risk aversion γ = 3, normal-times consumption growth µ = 0.0195, consumption
growth volatility σ = 0.0125, dividend growth µD = 0.04, idiosyncratic volatility σi = 0.05,
leverage φ = 3, and mean-reversion κλ = 0.12. Volatility σλ = 0.08 in the time-varying
disaster probability case, and σλ = 0 in the constant disaster probability case.
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